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The introduction of the Employment Contracts Act was opposed by many workers and has subsequently been condemned 
by a number of organisations. This paper attempts to address the question of why, given the widespread opposition to 
the proposed legislation, a general strike did not occur in an attempt to defeat the Employment Contracts Bill. It is argued 
that the failure of the leadership of the Council of Trade Unions to take up the call for a general strike and then to lead 
sue h an action was a key factor in the enactment of the Employment Contracts Act. Explanations for the unwillingness 
of the Council ofTrade Unions to lead a general strike are provided both by the thesis of bureaucratic conservatism and 
by the policy approach adopted by the Council of Trade Unions in the preceding years. 
In the aftennath of the enactment of the Employment 
Contracts Bill many New Zealander's were bitter and 
confused as to how such a fundamentally anti-union piece 
of legislation, opposed by the majority of the population, 
came to be introduced. This paper represents an attempt to 
address that issue. It will be argued that it was the 
capitulation of the trade union leadership to the wishes of 
employers and the National Government that led to the 
enactment of the legislation. Specifically, the failure of the 
Council of Trade Union's (C.T.U.) leadership to call for 
and lead a general strike is cited as a major conjunctural 
factor in the passage of the Bill. Other factors include the 
economic crisis, the shift in the balance of power between 
employers and unions and the rise of the New Right 
It is important to examine why the C.T.U. leadership 
neglected to respond to the wishes of its members. This is 
explained with reference to the policy approach adopted 
by the C.T .U. in the years preceding the introduction of the 
Employment Contracts Bill and with reference to the 
theory of bureaucratic conservatism. 
The thesis of bureaucratic conservatism 
A key restriction on the ability of trade unions to work 
effectively in the interests of their members is to be found 
within the unions themselves. Union officials tend to 
display a contingent conservatism.! This conservatism 
centrally involves a commitment by union officials to the 
established procedures of conflict resolution. This usually 
entails emphasising the role of negotiation in order to 
successfully conclude disputes. For this reason union 
officials are often concerned that industrial action does not 
accelerate to a point where they no longer have control. 
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Their conservatism is contingent because they are, to 
varying extents, underpressme to respond to their rank and 
file union members and also under pressure to respond to 
the wishes of employers and the govenunent. 2 The ability 
of union officials to manipulate the workplace situation is 
usually dependent upon the apathy or inexperience of most 
of their members. Where there are militant members 
within a union these are often not numerous or influential 
enough to sway the majority. 3 
There are two broad reasons for the conservatism of full 
time union officials. Firstly, they have their own interests, 
distinct from those of the rank and file. Secondly the 
concrete circumstances of trade union officialdom tend to 
cause conservatism. Trade union bureaucrats act as inter-
mediaries between capital and labour. Usually, officials 
are aware of their own role and interests and recognise that 
they are dependent on trade unionism for their livelihood. 
Thus they have no interest in jeopardising the status quo.4 
Trade union officials also develop conservative tenden-
cies as a result of the work they do. The nature of their woik 
requires that they be set apart from the ordinary members 
of the union. They become isolated both geographicaJJy 
and ideologically. It therefore becomes very difficult for 
officials to reflect the views of their members. 5 Often they 
enjoy greater job security and higher wages than rank -and-
file union members.6 Trade union officials will not usually 
ag~ee to tactics that will weaken their position within the 
trade union bureaucracy. Thus strike action is often op-
posed where it threatens the existence of the union or the 
maintenance of union fimds. Whilst union officials may 
wish to use the threat of strike action as a tool to influence 
an employer, they often do not wish to see this power 

























actually unleashed. 7 
In order to strengthen their position union officials empha-
sise negotiation and compromise. Rank-and-file members 
easily become dependent upon what they~rceive to be the 
experience and expertise of their officials. 8 Finally, there 
is usually a lack of accountability where trade union 
officials are concerned. Many are appointed rather than 
elected. Furthennore, it is common for union bureaucrats 
not to be subject to any regular, effective accountability. 
This limits the extent to which it is possible to keep their 
conservatism in check. 9 The thesis of bureaucratic con-
servatism helps us to understand the course of the struggle 
over the Employment Contracts Act 
The policy approach of the C.T .U. 
Since its inception in 1987 the C.T.U. has adopted a 
conciliatory approach towards both the government and 
employers. Probably the most obvious example of this 
prior to the struggle over the Employment Contracts Bill 
was the manoeuvring that occurred around the Compact 
The Compact was a proposed agieement between the 
Government, employers and unions initially and later 
between the Government and unions only. In its final 
fonn, the compact, entitled the 'Agreement for Growth' 
provided for a ceiling on wage settlements in retmn for a 
reduction in interest rates and the promise of talks between 
representatives of Government, unions and business. 
Whilst it is not possible here to discuss this issue in depth, 
there are a number of aspects of the negotiation that should 
be noted. The first problem area was the fact that the 
C.T.U. pamphlet 'Towards a Compact' was distributed 
only among trade union officials and not the rank-and-file. 
Thus, as early as March 1988, there was an absence of 
communication between the C.T.U. leadership and its 
members.1 0 At a meeting in Christchurch on May 24 
eighty union officials and job delegates requested that 
there should be more information available about the 
Compact plus the opportunity for open debate about the 
subject In W aikato, Bill Andersen and other officials from 
the Drivers Union refused the local anti-Compact group 
the opportunity to address stop-work meetings. This is 
evidence of the unwillingness of the C.T.U. leadership to 
allow open debate.11 
In mid-1989, the Northern Distribution Union held stop-
work meetings at which the Compact was discussed. A 
resolution of limited support for the Compact, which had 
been passed at theN D . U. delegates conference, was put to 
these stop work meetings The resolution was carried on a 
show of hands. However, there is some doubt as to whether 
the chair's decision was, in fact, accurate as a number of 
people who were present believe that the majority of those 
who voted were actuaJJy opposed to the Compact.l2 
The refusal of the C.T.U. to allow open debate continued 
withtherulingoftheC.T.U. vice-president,AngelaFoulkes. 
that the group, Trade Unionists Against the Compact, 
Labour, Employment and Work in New Zealand 1994 
would not be pennitted to present a petition to the C.T.U. 
conference. It was argued by the C.T.U. National Execu-
tive that such a petition would 'fall outside the C.T.U. 
constitution' .13 
The decision to discard the December 20th Compact 
proposal occurred without consultation with the union 
movement The C.T.U. National Council meetings on 
March 14 and March 15 did not endorse these changes 
which had been decided upon by the C.T.U.leadership.l4 
On April3, the C.T.U. conference was held at which two 
resolutions were put to the meeting. The first was proposed 
by the C. T. U. national executive which called for coopera-
tion between the C.T.U. and the Government. The second 
was proposed by the Service Workers Federation. It fa-
voured a campaign aimed at def~ting the economic agenda 
of the Business Roundtable. During the conference lunch-
break it was arranged that the C.T.U. National Executive 
would support the Service Wolkers Federation proposal in 
retmn for the Service Workers Federation support for the 
National Executive's Compact resolution.15-
In July 1990 five officials from the C.T.U. National 
Executive began meeting regularly with Helen C~ then 
the Labour Government's Minister of Labour. Of the five 
officials, Ken Douglas, Angela Fonlkes and Ron Burgess 
were to be permanently involved in negotiations with the 
Compact Council. The remaining two officials were to be 
chosen by the first three from the C.T.U. National Execu-
tive. Furthermore, the identity of these officials were not 
disclosed to the C.T.U. National Council, nor did the 
delegation report back to the National Council regarding 
what matters were discussed.l6 
The evidence suggests a measure of secrecy in the ap-
proachoftheC.T.U.leadershiptotheCompact Similarly, 
it seems likely that truly open debate was discouraged in 
favour of statements that merely supported the Compact 
There can be no doubt that the C.T.U. leadership was 
negligent in its failure to communicate effectively with its 
members. They declined to fight the right wing policies of 
the Labour Government preferring instead an offer of 
minimal consultation in the policy-making process. The 
importance placed by the C.T.U. on the Compact and, 
indeed. its approach towards securing the Compact is 
indicative of bureaucratic conservatism. 
The struggle over the Employment Contracts 
Act 
In my MA thesis, 'The Struggle For and Against the ECA 
1987 - 1991" a theoretical framework based on Marxist 
industrial relations theory is established. This is used to 
analyse the empirical evidence. An historical framework 
is also created within which to locate the struggle. Three 
chapters are then devoted to the case study. Chapter Tirree 
outlines the industrial relations environment from which 
the Employment Contracts Bill emerged. This deals with 
the nature of industrial relations under the Labour Rela-
tions Act. Chapter Four examines the period immediatley 
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prior to the introduction of the bill In Chapter Five the 
actions of the govemmen~ unions and employers in the 
period between the introduction of the bill and its enact-
ment are considered. In the rest of this paper, I focus on the 
complex union debate over the nature of appropriate 
action to take in opposition to the bill. Particular emphasis 
is given to the CfU' s Special Affiliates Conference. 
Pressure for a general strike was developing throughout 
the beginning of 1991. Early in April up to 1,000 members 
of the Northern Drug and Chemical Union held a stopwork 
meeting at which they called for a national twenty-four 
hour strike on May Day .17 On 5 April the New Zealand 
Herald had stated that the calls for a general strike would 
be discussed at the next C. T. U. national conference. Among 
the groups that had called for a national strike, according 
to the Herald, were the distribution wodcers, clerical 
workers and cleaners. The response of the C.T.U. indus-
trial officer was to say that the Council was unsure of the 
extent of the support for a national strike.18 Agitation for 
a general strike is reflected in the debate over whether to 
oppose the Bill (try to make changes to the proposed 
legislation) or whether to defeat the Bill (take action 
designed to make the Government retract the proposed 
legislation). 
There were widespread calls for effective leadership of the 
union movement On 21 April, at a special branch meeting, 
Nelson P.S.A. members passed a unanimous vote of no 
confidence in the P .S .A. president. Sue Piper. This was in 
response to the inaction of the P.S.A. on resolutions sent to 
it by the Nelson branch and by the unwillingness of the 
P .S .A to provide effective leadership for those who wished 
to defeat the Bill. The P .S .A told the Nelson branch that 
they would only sanction a one-day strike and cautioned 
their members regarding patient welfare - a reference to 
P .S.A. members who were employed at Ngawhatu psychi-
atric hospital.19 On 15 April, members of the Canterbury 
branch of the P .S .A. also passed a motion of no confidence 
in the P.S.A president. Again, this was a result of the 
failure of the P.S.A. to respond pqsitively to calls from the 
membership for a general strike.20 
The P.S.A. national executive was not the only body of 
trade union leaders to have upset its members. On 4 April, 
members of the Engineers Union at the Amotts biscuit 
factory in Auckland passed a vote of no confidence in 
Engineers Union national secretary, Rex Jones. The rea-
son given for this vote was J ones' .. lack of leadership in the 
fight against the Employment Contracts Bill and his appar-
ent acceptance of the Bill". They were also disappointed 
by the failure of the Engineers Union leadership to join 
them in a march on lO April against the Employment 
Contracts Act Furthermore, dislike was expressed for the 
part that Rex Jones had played in the signing of the 
Compact between the Labour Government and the C.T.U. 
national executive. 21 
In Hokitika on 15 April Ken Douglas was questioned as to 
why the C.T.U. leadership had declined to lead a general 
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strike in response to the Employment Contracts Bill. 
Douglas said that they would be ·~aiting forever" for him 
to give the call for a general strike. He contin~ "there 
has to be an answer other than just leading a protest 
parade".22 This remark was widely reported in the na-
tional media, providing further evidence of the C.T.U.'s 
reluctance to lead a general strike. 
Support for a general strike continued to build steadily. On 
12 April the executive director of the Nurses Association, 
Gay Williams, announced that nurses in the public sector 
had voted in favour of a strike. lbis strike was to be a one 
day strike, to occur on 29 April. 23 On Aprill4, Pat Kelly, 
secretary of the Cleaners, Caretakers and Security Officers 
Union speculated that there was a sixty percent chance of 
there being a general strike. Kelly said that whilst a number 
of unions had not decided upon a definite policy position 
they have stated that " if such a call is made they guarantee 
their members will support it". Kelly added that if the 
outcome of the special affiliates meeting on 18 April was 
a call for a general strike then he was confident of an 
overwhelming response from the country.24 
The speculation of Mr. Kelly regarding support for a 
general strike was echoed by Peter Monteith, retail secre-
tary of the Northern Distribution Union. Monteith based 
his estimate of support on the high attendance at stopwork 
meetings by his members. He said that meetings of shop 
workers held throughout the northern industrial district 
were attracting approximately two or three times the 
normal attendance and that the overall theme was one of 
overwhelming support for action against the Employment 
Contracts Bill. According to the New Zealand Herald, 
support for a strike had also come from "delegates from 
other unions whose management have not publicly backed 
the idea". However, statements made by Ken Douglas 
appear to contradict the assertions made by various union 
leaders and delegates regarding the support for a strike. 
Douglas stated that whilst some unions were keen to take 
strike action against the Employment Contracts Bill few 
had given their unreserved support for a twenty-four hour 
or a forty-eight hour stoppage. In describing the C.T.U. 
role in such an action Douglas said that the C.T.U. did not 
have the power to call a strike and instead was lookin~ at 
ways of changing public attitudes to the legislation. 2 
The C.T.U. special affiliates conference (18 
April) 
At the special C.T.U. affiliates conference on 18 April 
initial debate centred around the C.T.U. 's national execu-
tive's resolution, particularly clause C. Clause C called for 
affiliates to "participate in a national day of activity on 
April30, ranging from lunchtime meetings to a duration of 
twenty-four hours". Speaking in favour of the national 
executive resolution, Douglas said: "we need to be clear 
about what the resolution is for. It needs to be demonstra-
bly achievable, both nationally and in the regions. Mem-
bers come from different positions. What's important is 
what they are prepared to do not what they can be con-


















scripted to do. "26 
In response to the call for a general strike Douglas said that 
"we must not confuse uniformity with unity". Pat Kelly 
answered Douglas's statement with the assertion the "there 
have been calls f<X' a general stoppage, calls coming from 
the floor. I believe it is being sought by working people 
now. We can't ignore those calls".27 
Mter various argwnents both f<X' and against a general 
strike, Rick Barker of the Service Workers Federation 
moved an amendment calling for a twenty-four hour 
national stoppage on 30 April Barker said that "It is quite 
clear from all our stopwork meetings that there is support 
for a one-day stoppage. Each affiliate to the Service 
Workers Federation has had unanimous calls for a twenty-
four hour strike. There must be a specific response to that 
fa m call from workers. "28 
Hecontinue<L saying that members of the Service Workers 
Federation have said that "when they do it they want to do 
it together. They want a collective veil drawn over them 
because their employers can see when they are acting 
alone".29 
Mamice Ward of the Tramways Union had earlier moved 
an amendment to the resolution of the C.T .U. which called 
for the C. T. U. national executive to "organise a campaign 
of mass action to oppose the Employment Contracts Bill 
until it is withdrawn or defeated". Tony Wilton of the 
Journalists and Graphic Process Union supported this 
resolution. Thus, debate later in the conference centred 
around the calls for a general strike.30 
Card voting occured on the Service Workers Federation 
amendment and the amendment was defeated by 250,122 
to 190,910. According to The People's Voice, those unions 
which voted against a general strike included the Engi-
neers Union, The Public Service Association, Post Pri-
mary Teachers Association, Nurses Association, Post Of-
fice Union, Education Institute and the Financial Sector 
Union. 31 This is supported by evidence collected in inter-
views. Malcolm Blair of the Communication and Energy 
Workers Union confirmed that the Post Office Union 
voted against the amendment and that most of the major 
unions were not in favour of the amendment. Steph Breen 
of the Nurses Organisation (previously the Nurses Union 
and Nurses Association) said that there was never a call for 
a national strike by the C.T.U. and so the union could not 
say whether or not the members supported a national 
strike. However. it is likely that the members of the Nurses 
Union did indeed support a national strike. For example, in 
Dunedin alone on 10 April 600 votes out of 650 cast by 
health workers favoured a one day strike from 3pm April 
29 to 3pm April 30.32 It is plausible that such figures 
reflected a nationwide trend At the special C.T.U. affili-
ates conference the Nurses Union voted against the Serv-
ice Workers Federation Amendment. John Ryall said that 
it was mostly the state unions that voted against the 
amendment and the private sector unions that voted for the 
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amendment McKeefry of the Engineers Union said that 
the P.S.A., the Nurses Union, the education unions, the 
Post Office Union and the Engineers Union all voted 
against the amendment Colin Davies of the P.S.A. con-
firmed that the P.S.A. voted against the amendment as did 
the Engineers Union. The call for a general strike was also 
supported by some of the unions outside the C.T.U .. These 
included the Seafarers Union and the Building Trades 
Union.33 
Many of the trade union officials who voted against a 
general strike were also voting contlary to the wishes of 
their members. For example, 87% of Nurses Association 
members had voted for a twenty-four hour stoppage.34 
Similarly. even where workers were not balloted, high 
attendences at stop-work meetings should have indicated 
to union officials that the issue of a general strike should, 
at least, have been discussed with their members. This 
negligence can be explained by the thesis of bureaucratic 
conservatism. Trade union officials have a vested interest 
in the negotiation process. In this situation, therefore, the 
trade union bureaucracy sacrificed its members wishes in 
exchange for minimising the risks of destruction or distur-
bance to the C.T.U. structure and capabilities. 
The result of the C.T.U. affiliates conference immediately 
caused division within the union movement At the 2 May 
meeting of the Canterbury C.T.U. delegates from various 
unions reported that the failure to call for a general strike 
had divided their members. Dion Martin, organiser for the 
Distribution and General Worlcers Union also believed 
that people felt very strongly about the result of the C. T. U. 
affiliates conference. Furthermore, he stated that if the 
decision had been made on the basis of one union one vote 
then the general strike amendment would have been car-
ried35 
Douglas stated. after the meeting, that the decision not to 
hold a twenty-four hour general strike did not indicate that 
there was any division or dissent within the union move-
ment Mr Birch gave a positive response to the decision of 
theC.T.U.nottohold a general strike. Birch said that it was 
"obvious to all New Zealanders that strike action could not 
be justified" _36 
The nationwide day of action 
Around the country, various unions decided that their 
contribution to the 30 April day of action would be to take 
strike action of some form. The Auckland C. T. U. called for 
a five-hour regional strike from m id day Tuesday 30 April. 
District president Bill Andersen predicted that the march 
in Auckland on the day of action would be one of the 
biggest ever seen in the city. He said that the reason for 
only calling fora half-day regional strike was to obtain the 
maximum number of people on the march for a minimum 
stoppage of work. However, he conceded that some unions 
were recommending to their members that strike action be 
taken for a whole day.37 
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The Building Trades Union voted for a three-day strike to 
be held on the 29 and 30 April and on 1 May. The action 
would be in protest both at the collapse of their award and 
against the Employment Contracts Bill. Ashley Russ, 
secretary of the Building Trades Union stated that "in 
continuing their demands for the abolition of travelling 
time and an extension of the ordinary hours of work 
beyond an eight -hour day, the employers are si~g 
their intention to end the national award system". 38 The 
decision to hold a three-day strike was supported by over 
ninety percent of the Building Trade Union's members. 
Support for a general strike, if the C.T.U. called for one, 
was almost 100 percent of the Building Trade Union's 
members.39 
Health workers were unable to take the twenty-four hour 
strike that their members had favoured because the Labour 
Court granted injunctions to the Auckland and Otago area 
health boards to Jbvent certain workers from withdraw-
ing their labour. 
At Kinlei~ pulp and paper workers decided against a 
twenty-four hour stoppage after New Zealand Forest Prod-
ucts began legal action. Instead. they voted for a three hour 
strike.ln Kawerau, workers at the Tasman Pulp and Paper 
Mill voted to hold a twenty-four hour strike and the 
Hawkes Bay pulp mill workers voted for similar action. 
Meatworkers voted to strike for twenty-four hours. Gov-
ernment department staff participated in various actions 
ranging from a twenty-four hour strike to work bans.41 
At various stopwork meetings feelings among teachers 
were rurming high regarding appropriate action for 30 
April. The Auckland branch of the Post Primary Teachers 
Association passed an amendment which called for a 
twenty-four hour strike. This was despite a proposal by the 
executive that the teachers limit themselves to a five-hour 
stoppage. Len Richards of N ga Tapuwae College accused 
C.T.U. president Ken Douglas of "working for the Gov-
ernment in resisting the pressure for a general strike". He 
stated that "national delegates of his own union had no 
right to vote against a general strike along with other state 
sector unions" at the special C.T.U. affiliates conference 
on 18 April. A national negotiator for the P .P.T.A., Mark 
Barrow responded that a strike which received seventy 
percent support would be seen as a failure by the media and 
the government but a national day of action with similar 
support would be seen as successfu1.42 
The day of action was a huge success with sixty thousand 
people marching against the Employment Contracts Bill. 
Many marchers took up chants in favour of a general strike. 
In Auckland a rally was held at Aotea Square, chaired by 
Bill Andersen. The efforts of Peter Hughes, chairman of 
the Auckland branch of the Communist Party, to put 
forward a resolution for a general strike were unsuccessful 
as union officials physically prevented him from reaching 
the microphone. Andersen put forward a resolution which 
'condemned' the Bill and welfare cuts and called for future 
union action.43 
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On 1 May a huge May Day rally occurred despite the 
efforts of the C.T.U. The leaders of the Auckland C.T.U. 
and the C.T.U. national office wanted the May Day com-
mittee to hold their march on 30 April and have a celebra-
tion on 1 May to commemorate May Day .44 
Two days later, on 3 May Parliament passed the Employ-
ment Contracts Bill by a forty-three to twenty-four major-
ity.45 
Conclusion 
There are a number of ways in which the nature of trade 
union officialdom is reflected in the New Zealand experi-
ence over the Employment Contracts Act. A number of 
trade union officials emphasised the importance of the 
continuity and credibility of their trade union at the ex-
pense of mass struggle. For example, in defending the 
decision of the Nurses Union to oppose strike action, Steph 
Breen stated that "'There's a difference between idealism 
and pragmatism and realism; about who's got their feet on 
the grmmd and who's just standing up waving the banner. 
If you 're going to say we 're going to do this you've got to 
be able to deliver or otherwise your credibility goes down 
the tubes. -.46 
Similarly, John McKeefry, of the Engineers' Union, in 
discussing the strategy that his union adopted in response 
to the Employment Contracts Bill states that: "'They (Na-
tional) were going to do it. we'd best not enrage them 
further, we'd best not take that option and what we'd best 
do is to prepare a very well-researched submission arguing 
for the alternative which is the high wage, high skill 
economy and arguing that we needed to have a coordinated 
labour relations policy across the country to ensure that 
standards are kept up and that the emphasis is not on short-
term wage cutting solutions but investing in training and 
ski Us and thinJs like that and we'd best educate our own 
employees. t-4 
The leadership of the C.T .U. in particular placed consider-
able emphasis on compromise and upon their negotiating 
ability. This is evidenced in the decision of the C.T.U. to 
mount a protest campaign aimed at achieving major modi-
fications to the bill rather than the abolition of the bill 
entirely. Similarly, in his speech to protesters in Auckland 
in April 1991, Bill Anderson stressed that if the protest 
activities were not sufficient to persuade the government 
to withdraw the bill then the unions would have to try for 
the "best possible agreement". Finally, the fact that the 
C.T.U. adopted the 'oppose the bill' line rather than the 
'defeat the bill' line favoured by many is an indication that 
they were more interested in negotiation than in struggle. 
There were three specific ways in which union leaders 
contributed to the government' s ability to pass the Em-
ployment Contracts Act with very little difficulty. Firstly. 
the C.T.U. failed to call for a general strike. This was 
despite the clear majority support for a general strike from 
rank-and-file unionists and, indeed, from many branch 








organisations affiliated to the C.T.U., for example, the 
Canterbury branch of the P.S.A. In~ Ken Douglas 
indi~ in his speech to protest(n at Hokitika on 15 
April, (bef<R the Special Affiliates Conference of 18 
April) that the C.T.U. was unwilling to lead a general 
strike. 
The leadership of many unions were out of step with their 
members' wishes when they block voted against a general 
strike at the C.T.U. Special Affiliates Conference on 18 
April. These unions included theP.S.A., the Nurses Union, 
theEngineersUniooandtheP.P.T.A.Somehavedefended 
their actions on the grounds that they did not ballot their 
members and so they were unsure of the support for strike 
action - f<X" example, the Engineers Union and the Nurses 
Organisation. The level of support for strike action both on 
the streets and at regional stopwork meetings indicate that 
such union leaders would have been well aware of the 
general feeling regarding strike action and that in fact it 
was this awareness that prevented them from balloting 
members because they knew what the result would be. 
Finally, the C.T.U. acted negligently when it refused to 
provide any centralise'd leadership. It was decided that 
action should be organised on a region by region basis. As 
the umbrella body for unions, the C.T.U. abdicated its 
responsibility when it refuse'd to provide national coordi-
nation for regional activities. Furthermore, when regional 
action contradicted the official stance, as it did in Canter-
bury, the C.T.U. took measures designed to sabotage this 
action thus contravening its own stated decision regarding 
regional autonomy. 
The scale of the various protest activities and meetings 
descn"bed above indicate that there clearly was majority 
support for strike action among wolkers. That there was 
widespread supp<n for strike action is shown by the vast 
numbers of people who were involved in protest marches 
in early 1991. Similarly the high attendances at stopwork 
meetings illustrate the depth of feeling in the country at 
large. Statements by government ministers indicate that 
there was an awareness of this among those people pivotal 
to the introduction of the Bill. For example, Bolger pub-
licly attacked the union movement and Birch responded 
angrily to the introduction of some closed shops. Finally, 
Max Bradford even indicated that some changes to the 
legislation might be necessary in the face of such strong 
opposition.48 The blame for the absence of a general strike 
should therefore be laid at the feet of the union leaders who 
declined to organise an action which their membership 
wanted. A general strike could have defeated the Bill -
protest activities alone were never going to achieve that 
goal. 
Future research 
This paper answers some questions about this period in 
New Zealand's labour history but also indicates a need for 
many others to be asked. Such concerns might include the 
nature of any industrial action that could be taken. This 
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would encompass its likely effects, sustainability and the 
extent to which it would be both nationwide and across a 
variety of industries. 
One potential area for further research is an in depth 
analysis of the government concerns about the struggle 
over the Employment Contracts Acl Such concerns might 
include the nature of any industrial action that could be 
taken. This would encompass its likely effects, 
sustainability and the extent to which it would be both 
nationwide and across a variety of industries. This would 
require access to the appropriate ministerial documents. 
Similarly, it would be interesting to examine the concerns 
of the New Zealand Employers Federation and the New 
Zealand Business Roundtable about the struggle over the 
Employment Contracts Act at the time.ln other words, did 
they feel that the charges embodied in the proposed legis-
lation were under threat in the early months of 1991? 
A further potential area of research could be a comparison 
of the influence of the C.T.U. leadership within the union 
movement both before and after the Employment Coo-
tracts Acl This could incorporate an analysis of the effect 
upon the C.T.U. of its failure to lead a general strike. 
Finally, it could be valuable to compare the introduction of 
the Employment Contracts Act with efforts to introduce 
enteiprise bargaining in Australia a.n<L ind~ in other 
advanced capitalist countries (see paper by Neilson in this 
volume). 
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